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INTRODUCTION

On October 23, 1979, two electricians, David Woodend and Kenneth
Morris, responded to a service call from a retailer who was experiencing a
lighting problem in his store.' They determined the cause of the dim and
blinking lights to be a defective phase in a switch manufactured by Federal

1. Federal Pac. Elec. Co. v. Woodend, 735 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1987, no writ). The example given in the introduction summarizes the facts of the Woodend
case. See id. at 889-91.
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Pacific Electric Company.2 Having obtained a replacement switch from the
manufacturer, Woodend returned the next day and attempted to remove the
old faulty switch, whereby an explosion occurred severely burning him.3
Woodend sued Federal Pacific Electric Company in a Texas court under
both negligence and strict product liability theories.4 The parties strongly
disputed the cause of the explosion. 5 At trial, the plaintiff, demonstrating

his theory of the source of the explosion, attempted to introduce into evidence a switch containing improved safety features developed by the defend-

ant manufacturer in 1979 or 1980.6 Federal Pacific Electric Company
objected to the admission of the evidence, claiming that the later-designed
switch was a "subsequent remedial measure. '' 7 Both the trial court and the
court of appeals allowed the evidence to be admitted.
II.

DEFINITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBSEQUENT
REMEDIAL MEASURES

A subsequent remedial measure is defined as an action which, if taken9
prior to an accident, would have decreased the probability of its occurrence.
In order to qualify under the definition, the remedial action must meet three

2. Id.
3. Id. at 889-90. Woodend returned without the supervision of Morris, the senior electrician, because it was Saturday. Woodend had never worked on the type of equipment installed
at Six Flags Mall. Id. at 889. The hot gases which burned Woodend were caused by metal
parts melting and vaporizing. Id. at 890.
4. Id. at 889. Cases involving subsequent remedial evidence are often brought under both
negligence and strict product liability theories. See, e.g., Middleton v. Harris Press and Shear,
Inc., 796 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir. 1986)(suit by widow whose husband was killed in industrial
baling machine accident based on negligence and product liability); Cann v. Ford, 658 F.2d 54,
56 (2d Cir. 198 1)(suit for damages for injuries sustained when transmission jumped gear under
negligence and product liability theories); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir.
1980)(suit based on negligence and strict liability theories to recover for injuries caused by
defective drug), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981). See generally Comment, Subsequently
Remedying Strict Products Liability: Cann v. Ford, 14 CONN. L. REV. 759, 771 (1982)(discussing effectiveness of limiting instructions where both negligence and product liability theories used.)
5. Woodend, 735 S.W.2d at 890-91. The manufacturer argued that Woodend caused the
explosion by improper handling of a screwdriver. Id. at 891. Woodend contended that the
negligent or defective design of the switch caused his injury. Id.
6. Id. at 891-92. The new switch incorporated three new features: 1) a warning to deenergize prior to working on switch, 2) additional insulation barriers to prevent transfer of
electricity between phases on switch, and 3) additional barrier on back of switch. Id. at 891.
The court's opinion contained a diagram of the new switch, Id. at 897.
7. Id. at 891.
8. Id.
9. See FED. R. EVID. 407 (defining subsequent remedial measures as "[w]hen, after an
event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to
occur..."); see also TEX. R. EVID. 407 (adopting same definition as federal rule). See gener-
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requirements. ° First, the measure must have been taken subsequent to the
accident.11 In the Woodend case, the manufacturer's attorneys stated that
the new design was not available until 1979 or 1980.12 To satisfy this first
requirement the new switch must have been unavailable until after October
24, 1979, the date of the accident.13 The second requirement under the definition is that the action must have been taken in response to the accident. 4
In the Woodend example, the court must have concluded that the change
was in response to the accident due to the brief time lag between the explosion and the implementation of the new switch design.15 The final definitional requirement is that the measure must have been taken by a party to
the suit.16 Since the defendant manufacturer, Federal Pacific Electric Company, developed the change in the switch in the Woodend case, this require17
ment was met.
ally INTRODUCTION TO LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5.17 (2d ed. 1987)(defining subsequent remedial
measures as new safety measures which could have prevented injuries and giving examples).
10. See Sales, Product Liability Law in Texas, 23 Hous. L. REV. 1, 176-78 (1986)(indepth analysis of requirements action must meet to be considered subsequent remedial measure under federal rule 407).
11. See FED. R. EvID. 407 (measures taken after event fall under definition); TEX. R.
EVID. 407 (requiring measure to be after accident); see also Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573
F.2d 1332, 1343 (5th Cir. 1978)(report written by Ford prior to accident admissible). See
generally Sales, ProductLiability Law in Texas, 23 Hous. L. REV. 1, 176-77 (1986)(explaining
Fifth Circuit's holding in Rozier).
12. Federal Pac. Elec. Co. v. Woodend, 735 S.W.2d 887, 892 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1987, no writ).
13. Id. at 889; see also FED. R. EVID. 407 (measure must be taken after accident).
14. See Arceneaux v. Texaco, Inc., 623 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 1980)(change in gas tank
location admissible since made in response to federal regulations not accident); see also McCants v. Salameh, 608 S.W.2d 304, 308 (Tex. App.-Waco 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(emphasizes
importance of responsive nature of change by excluding evidence of product change occurring
twenty years after accident). See generally Sales, Product Liabilitj Law in Texas, 23 Hous. L.
REV. 1, 177 (1986)(explaining responsiveness requirement).
15. Woodend, 735 S.W.2d at 889-92. The accident occurred in October, 1979, and the
switch was available in 1979 or 1980. Id.
16. See, e.g., Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prod. & Mfg., 798 F.2d 700, 719-20 (5th Cir.
1986)(memo concerning subsequent repairs admissible since written by non-party); Grenada
Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 889 (5th Cir. 1983)(evidence of nonparty alteration in design admissible against party manufacturer); Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562
F.2d 518, 528 & n.20 (8th Cir. 1977)(evidence of modifications made by trucking firm not
excludable in case against manufacturer of metal clips); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Williams, 370 F.2d 839, 843-44 (5th Cir. 1966)(repairs made by State Highway Department
admissible in case against railroad). See generally Introduction to Law of Evidence § 5.17 (2d
ed. 1987)(tendency to admit evidence when repairs made by third parties).
17. Woodend, 735 S.W.2d at 891.
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ADMISSIBILITY OF SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES IN
NEGLIGENCE CASES

In 1892, the United States Supreme Court, following the trend in state
court decisions, held that evidence of machinery changes made after an accident was inadmissible to prove negligent conduct 1 8 This pattern of inadmissibility continued in twentieth century case law,1 9 and in 1975, Congress
codified the exclusion into Federal Rule of Evidence 407, the wording of
which has been almost universally adopted by the states. 20 Although subsequent remedial measures are inadmissible to prove negligent conduct, rule
407 provides that such measures are admissible for other purposes, including
impeachment or proof of "ownership, control or feasibility of precautionary
measures, if controverted ..... 2' In the Woodend case, evidence of the

18. See Columbia and Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 208 (1892)(evidence of machinery changes after accident inadmissible in negligence action); see also Terre
Haute & Indiana R.R. v. Clem, 23 N.E. 965, 965-66 (Ind. 1890)(error to admit evidence of
changes and repairs to crossing in action for negligent construction); Morse v. Minneapolis &
St. Louis Ry., 16 N.W. 358, 359 (Minn. 1883)(excluded evidence of repairs to switch). See
generally Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence 407 and Strict ProductsLiability - The Rule
Against Subsequent Repairs Lives On, 48 J. AIR L. & CoM. 887, 893 (1983)(analyzing admissibility of post accident repairs in early case law).
19. See, e.g., Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1184 (5th Cir. 1971)(error in
relying on subsequent safety devices as evidence of negligence); Limbeck v. Interstate Power
Co., 69 F.2d 249, 251 (8th Cir. 1934)(exclusion of evidence of construction changes proper);
Southern Ry. v. Simpson, 131 F. 705,'711 (6th Cir. 1904)(evidence of initiation of custom of
blowing whistle at crossing after accident inadmissible). See generally Recent Cases, Evidence
of Subsequent Remedial Measures and Products Liability: Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv.
Inc., 33 DE PAUL L. REV. 857, 860 & n.17 (1984)(discussing states which rely on case law
rule).
20. See FED. R. EVID. 407. The rule states:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the
event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent remedial measures is not admissible
to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
Id.; see also 3 & 4 JOSEPH, SALTZBURG, & THE TRIAL EVIDENCE COMMITTEE OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LITIGATION, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES (1987)(collecting pamphlets from thirty-one states containing
separate text of each state's rules). Maine Rule of Evidence 407 rejects the universal rule by
generally admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures. MAINE R. EVID. 407. See
generally Comment, The Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict Liability
Actions: Some Suggestions Regarding FederalRule ofEvidence 407, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1413, 1415-16 & n.2 (1982)(discussing treatment of rule codifications in various states).
21. See FED. R. EVID. 407. The rule states:
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures
when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
Id. These exceptions have been recognized in the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888-89 (5th Cir. 1983)(noting feasibility
exception requires contravention); Woolard v. Mobil Pipe Line Co., 479 F.2d 557, 563 (5th
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newly designed switch was inadmissible under the negligence theory, since it
was not introduced for any of the admissible purposes.22 However, controversy arises as to whether the later-designed switch would be admissible
under the plaintiff's second theory-strict product liability.23 This comment
will focus upon the conflicting rules of admissibility faced by attorneys attempting to introduce evidence of subsequent remedial measures in Texas
product liability cases.
IV.

A.

SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES IN TEXAS
PRODUCT LIABILITY CASES

Introduction of Strict Product Liability in Texas

In 1942, the Texas Supreme Court signaled its adoption of a strict product
liability theory by holding a manufacturer liable based on public policy considerations in Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps.24 The Decker case
involved the liability of a manufacturer for the production of contaminated
sausage which caused serious illness to a consumer. 25 The court focused on
rules applicable to food producers, implying that the public policy basis for
liability was limited to manufacturers of food.26 In 1967, Texas expressly
adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Law of Torts27 as the
product liability theory applicable in cases involving "defective products
Cir.)(evidence to be admitted under control exception), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1025 (1973);
American Airlines v. United States, 418 F.2d 180, 196 (5th Cir. 1969)(evidence allowed for
impeachment purposes). The Texas courts have also recognized these areas as exceptions to
inadmissibility. See, e.g., Howard v. Faberge Inc., 679 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(noting various cases supporting exceptions and allowing
evidence for impeachment purposes); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Boyett, 675 S.W.2d 782, 790
(Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1984, no writ)(evidence allowed to show feasibility of
alternatives).
22. Federal Pac. Elec. Co. v. Woodend, 735 S.W.2d 887, 892 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1987, no writ)(noting proof of negligence as inadmissible purpose for evidence).
23. See Henderson, Product Liability and Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures: Resolving the Conflict by Recognizing the Difference Between Negligence and Strict Tort
Liability, 64 NEB. L. REV. 1, 3 (1985)(listing numerous commentaries discussing controversy);
see also Note, The Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict Liability Actions:
Some Suggestions RegardingFederal Rule of Evidence 407, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1415,
1416 n.10 (1982)(commenting on courts' disagreements on applicability).
24. 139 Tex. 609, 610, 164 S.W.2d 828, 829 (1942). The manufacturer's liability was not
deemed to be based on negligence or breach of the usual implied warranties but on public
policy protection of "human health and life." Id. See generally Sales, ProductLiability Law in
Texas, 32 Hous. L. REV. 1, 4 (1986)(discussing Decker placement in development of product
liability theory in Texas).
25. Decker, 139 Tex. at 610, 164 S.W.2d at 828.
26. Id. at 611-22, 164 S.W.2d at 829-34. The court cited the Texas Penal Code which
prohibited the manufacture of impure foods. Id. at 622, 164 S.W.2d at 834.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A (1965). Section 402A states:
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which cause physical harm to persons."'2 1 In McKisson v. Sales Affiliates,
Inc.,29 a suit was brought to recover damages for burns and loss of hair
resulting from the use of a permanent wave solution distributed by Sales
Affiliates.3" The court held that since "no sound distinction" existed between food products causing illness and other types of products causing
physical harm, the rule in Decker should be extended beyond food products. " Certain justifications for the different approaches to the admission of
subsequent remedial evidence rely on the policies underlying the adoption of
a strict product liability theory for support. Therefore, these policies are
important in analyzing the strength of the justifications for the different
views.
The first policy advanced in support of a strict liability theory is that manufacturers are better able to absorb and distribute losses than consumers,
and therefore they should bear the burden.3 2 Since the risk of harm to consumers from defective products is constant and general, it is said that the
protection against potential harm should also be constant and general.3 3 The
manufacturer is able to provide this general protection by obtaining insur-

One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to

the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
Id.
28. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. 1967); see also Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Tex. 1967)(decided same day as

McKisson using strict liability theory). See generally Note, Texas Adopts a System of Pure
ComparativeApportionmentfor Strict Product Liability Cases: Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
15 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 479, 480-81 (1984)(commenting on impact of cases on product liability
theory in Texas).
29. 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
30. McKisson, 416 S.W.2d at 790.
31. Id. at 789. The court referred to other courts which have also pointed out the lack of

a sound distinction. See, e.g., Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 914-15 (5th Cir.
1964)(no distinction between wheelchair with weak axle causing broken leg and fly in coke
causing upset stomach); McKisson, 408 S.W.2d at 128 (Northcutt, J., concurring)(eye wash
solution impairing vision not distinct from foodstuff causing illness).
32. See, e.g., Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 697 F.2d 1252, 1255 (5th Cir. 1983)(burden on manufacturer based on ability to distribute as production cost and insure against); Challoner v. Day
and Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 84 (5th Cir.)(costs borne by manufacturer who produces
risk and able to insure against it), vacated, 423 U.S. 3 (1975); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.
Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962)(costs placed on manufacturer who creates risk). See generally Sales, ProductLiability Law in Texas, 23 Hous. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1986)(discussing "deeppocket" theory).
33. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1945)(Traynor, J., concurring)(protection should be general and constant).
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ance and spreading its cost to the general public by increasing prices.34 Secondly, by imposing strict liability, the plaintiff's burden of proof is lessened,
thereby providing a better means of compensation for the injured party.35 In
Decker, the Texas Supreme Court reasoned that since it would be impossible
for a consumer to prove the circumstances surrounding the manufacture of a
defective product, requiring such proof would effectively deny recovery. 3 6
To avoid this result, the court rejected the application of a negligence standard in defective product cases. 37 The final policy underlying a strict product liability theory is that by placing the burden of loss on the manufacturer,
accident prevention would be encouraged, thereby increasing consumer
safety.3" Since products are generally used by consumers without inspection
and the manufacturer is usually a better judge of quality and condition, the
manufacturer is better able to prevent the accident.3 9 Protection of public
health and life is envisioned by the Texas Supreme Court as the ultimate
goal of a strict product liability theory."
B.

Two Conflicting Views on Admissibiliy of Subsequent
Remedial Measures

In GrenadaSteel Industries v. Alabama Oxygen Company,4" the Fifth Circuit initially addressed the issue of admissibility of subsequent remedial
measures in product liability cases.4 2 In Grenada Steel, a leaky valve attached to a cylinder of acetylene gas caused an explosion at a plant.43 The

34. Id.
35. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976)(since no proof of
negligence or willful conduct required burden of proof eased allowing better compensation of
innocent consumer). See generally Henderson, Products Liability and Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures: Resolving The Conflict By Recognizing the Difference Between Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 64 NEB. L. REV. 1, 7 (1983)(listing ease of burden of proof as
one justification for strict liability).
36. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 621, 164 S.W.2d 828, 834
(1942).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944)(Traynor, J.,
concurring)(public interest in fixing responsibility to best reduce hazards to consumers); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240, 243 (Haw. 1970)(human safety important policy reason for adoption of theory); Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 258 N.E.2d 681,
686 (Ind. App. 1970)(protection of consuming public special societal concern). See generally
Recent Cases, Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures and ProductsLiability: Herndon v.
Seven Bar Flying Serv. Inc., 33 DE PAUL L. REV. 857, 868-69 (1984)(asserting importance of
consumer safety policy).
39. Decker, 139 Tex. at 612-13, 164 S.W.2d at 829-30.
40. Id. at 611, 164 S.W.2d at 829,
41. 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983)
42. Id. at 886.
43. Id. at 885.
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plaintiff proffered evidence of a subsequent change that the manufacturer
had made in the valve design.' The Fifth Circuit held that Federal Rule of
Evidence 407 applied in determining the admissibility of the design
change.4 5 Following the majority view, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the rule
as requiring the exclusion of subsequent remedial evidence in product liability cases and refused to allow the evidence to be admitted.4 6
However, the rule applied by Texas courts differs from the federal rule.47

Texas Rule of Evidence 407 follows the minority position which allows the
subsequent remedial evidence to be admitted.4" The leading case for the

44. Id. One year after the sale of the cylinder to Grenada Steel in 1974 the manufacturer
stopped producing the valve, and in 1977, the valve was not being marketed. Id.
45. Id. The court analyzed the applicability of state or federal rules and concluded that
the federal rules apply since admissibility of evidence is a procedural matter. Id. In later cases
the court applied the federal rule without comment. See Middleton v. Harris Press & Shear
Inc., 796 F.2d 747, 751 (5th Cir. 1986)(applying federal rule 407 to determine admissibility of
post-accident changes without discussion). However, the Tenth Circuit held that, when state
law interprets rule 407, the state policy governs the admissibility of subsequent remedial evidence in diversity actions. See Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Brequet Aviation, 727 F.2d
917, 932-33 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 853 (1984). See generally Note, Admissibility of
Subsequent Remedial Measures Evidence in Diversity Actions Based on Strict Products Liability,
53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1485, 1501-1502 (1985)(analyzes diversity principles and concludes
state law applies); Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 407. New Controversy Besets the Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1611, 1627-1647 (1985)(comparing
two approaches in light of diversity principles and concluding that the federal rule should
apply).
46. See Grenada Steel, 695 F.2d at 888. Most circuits agree with the Fifth Circuit and
exclude the evidence. See, e.g., Joseph v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 990-91 (3d Cir. 1982)(reiterating that federal rule 407 applies in products liability actions); Hall v. American Steamship Co., 688 F.2d 1061, 1066 (6th Cir. 1982)(evaluating admissibility of evidence under
federal rule 407); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856-58 (4th Cir. 1980)(stating common
law policy for federal rule dictates exclusion in product liability cases), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1080 (1981); Oberst v. Int'l Harvester Co., 620 F.2d 862, 866-67 (7th Cir. 1980)(rejecting
contention that federal rule 407 does not apply to products liability actions); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1134 (1st Cir.)(no error in holding evidence inadmissible in products
liability cases under federal rule 407), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1978). See generally Recent
Cases, Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures and Products Liability: Herudon v. Seven
Bar Flying Serv. Inc., 33 DE PAUL L. REV. 857, 862 (1984)(citing Fifth Circuit's opinion in
Grenada Steel as illustrative of majority view).
47. See TEX. R. EvID. 407. The Texas rule adds an additional sentence: "[n]othing in
this rule shall preclude admissibility in products liability cases based on strict liability." Id.
The Texas rules apply to "all judicial proceedings commencing after [September 1, 1983],
regardless of when the cause of action accrued." 46 TEX. B.J. 117 (1983).
48. See Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1150-53 (Cal. 1975)(setting
forth the minority position). The Ault case is frequently cited as precedent for the minority
view. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 794 (Ala. 1981)(citing Ault as
lead case for admission of evidence); Shaffer v. Honeywell Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251, 257 n.7 (S.D.
1976)(citing Ault as authority for admission of evidence); see also Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying
Serv. Inc., 716 F.2d 1332, 1331 (10th Cir. 1983)(following minority position holding evidence
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minority position is Ault v. InternationalHarvesterCo. 49 In Ault, the plaintiff was seriously injured when the vehicle in which he was a passenger
plunged five hundred feet to a canyon bottom.5" The plaintiff contended
that the accident was caused by a defective gear box.5" Plaintiff's witnesses
testified that the gear box was constructed with Aluminum 380, an unsuita-

ble material.5 2 At trial, plaintiff proffered evidence that the manufacturer
had replaced the Aluminum 380 with malleable iron, a more suitable material, in gear boxes manufactured subsequent to the accident.5 3 The California Supreme Court allowed admission of the evidence, holding that rule

407's exclusions did not apply in strict liability cases.54 Therefore, whereas
Texas courts would allow evidence of subsequent remedial evidence to be
admitted, the Fifth Circuit would exclude the same type of evidence.
C. Justificationsfor the Opposing Positions

The first justification advanced in support of the Fifth Circuit's exclusion
of subsequent remedial measures is that such evidence has low probative
value as an admission of product defects.5 Proponents of the Fifth Circuit
view contend that there are many reasons why manufacturers might make
subsequent product changes, including ordinary improvement and marketing tactics.56 As Justice Clark asserted in his dissenting opinion in Ault,

to be admissible). See generally Henderson, Product Liability and Admissibility of Subsequent
Remedial Measures: Resolving the Conflict by Recognizing the Difference Between Negligence
and Strict Tort Liability, 64 NEB. L. REv. 1, 16 & n.59 (1985)(commenting on adoption by
states of Ault reasoning and listing additional states which follow); Note, FederalRule of Evidence 407: New Controversy Besets the Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures. 30
VILL. L. REv. 1611, 1617-18 & n.40 (1985)(noting only Tenth and Seventh Circuits follow
minority view).
49. 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1975).
50. Id. at 1150.
51. Id. The defendant contended that the driver's negligence or the roadway collapsing
caused the accident and the gear box merely broke on impact. Id.
52. Id. Aluminum 380 was allegedly too weak a metal and susceptible to metal fatigue.
Id.
53. Id. The manufacturer had made the change three years after the accident. Id.
54. Id. at 1152.
55. Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 887-88 (5th Cir.
1983). See generally INTRODUcTION TO LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5.17 (2d ed. 1987)(explaining
relevancy rationale for excluding evidence).
56. See GrenadaSteel, 695 F.2d at 887-88 (changes made due to better way to manufacture discovered or implement new idea or plan); see also Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848,
857 (4th Cir. 1980)(product change possible without previous defect), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1080 (1981); accord Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co., 573 P.2d 785, 791 (Wash. 1978)(change
may be implemented for reasons other than defect); Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528
P.2d 1148, 1156 (Cal. 1975)(Clark, J., dissenting)(change to lower production costs, increase
marketability or efficiency).
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when car manufacturers introduce new models each year, the industry's purpose for doing so is not to replace the previous year's defective models.57
Given the numerous possible reasons for making subsequent product
changes, the Fifth Circuit concludes that evidence of a subsequent change
58
"has little relevance" to the issue of whether a product was defective.
However, both the Texas and the Federal rules define relevancy as "evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence

to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it

would be without the evidence." 9 Opponents of the majority view assert
that since juries may infer from the subsequent change that the product was
defective, the evidence would be logically relevant. 60 The fallacy of the Fifth
Circuit's position arises from a misinterpretation of the relevance standard.6 1
Although an item of evidence may have many competing inferences, the probative value of the evidence in relation to each of the inferred facts is merely
reduced, not negated. Therefore, since a jury may infer from evidence of a
product change that the product was defective, low probative value is a weak
rationale for the exclusion of the evidence.6 2
A second rationale in support of the Fifth Circuit position maintaining
that subsequent remedial evidence is inadmissible is that strict liability is a
form of culpability, 63 and rule 407 expressly prohibits evidence of subsequent change to prove culpable conduct.' The defendant manufacturer is

57. Ault, 528 P.2d at 1156 (Clark, J., dissenting).
58. GrenadaSteel, 695 F.2d at 887-88. The Fifth Circuit used the low relevancy rationale
as its main justification for exclusion. Id. at 887. The court asserted that judgments based on
the reasons manufacturers make changes in their products are impossible to formulate without
evidentiary proof by the manufacturer. Id. at 887-88. The court concluded that admission of
evidence on reasons for subsequent changes will detract from the real issue whether the product defect existed when it was sold. Id. at 888.
59. TEX.R. EvID. 401; accord FED. R. EVID. 401.
60. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 794 (Ala. 1981)(subsequent
modification highly probative of product character); Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp.,
281 N.E.2d 749, 753 (Il1. App. 1972)(subsequent change relevant to design alternative feasibility); Capara v. Chrysler Corp., 417 N.E.2d 545, 551 (N.Y. 198 1)(probability of product defect
increased by evidence of change, thereby logically relevant).
61. See Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv. Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir.
1983)(stating Fifth Circuit's low probative value rationale unconvincing). The court generally
defined relevancy and implied that the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted the relevancy definition.
Id. at 1328-1329.
62. See TEX. R. EvID. 401. The evidence of subsequent change would tend to make the
likelihood of a product defect more probable. Id.; accord FED. R. EvID. 401.
63. Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856-57 (4th Cir. 1980)(rule 407 applies to strict
liability), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981). The Fourth Circuit asserts that strict liability is
less blameworthy than culpable conduct or negligence; therefore, if the rule protects these
more blameworthy levels of conduct, it should also apply to strict liability. Id.
64. See FED. R. EvID. 407 (stating subsequent remedial evidence not admissible as proof
of negligence or culpability).
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liable or "culpable" even though not technically blameworthy in the sense of
being willful or negligent.65 However, Texas courts, opposing the Fifth Circuit view, assert that the existence of culpable conduct or fault is not at issue,
but rather the product is the focus in strict tort liability.6 6 While the Texas
view67 is technically correct given the general definition of strict product liability, subscribers to the Fifth Circuit position respond that the suit is styled
"Consumer X v. Manufacturer" not "Consumer X v. Product." 68 Furthermore, since the jury may imply from the evidence of the change that the
product was defective and the manufacturer is liable for defective products,
evidence of the change indirectly suggests that the change was an admission
of fault, which is the suggested inference that the rule was designed to
reject. 69
A third justification which the Fifth Circuit uses to uphold the exclusion
of the subsequent remedial evidence is the encouragement of subsequent repairs. 7' The Fifth Circuit reasons that if the evidence is admissible, manufacturers will choose not to make the changes to avoid generating the
evidence, thereby defeating one purpose for a product liability theory - increased consumer safety. 7' However, the Ault court led the rejection of this

65. Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984).
66. See Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 281 N.E.2d 749, 753 (Ill. App. 1972)(holding emphasis on character of product). The Ault court maintains that strict liability existed
when the rule was established; thus, if the drafters had intended to exclude the evidence in
products liability cases, they would have so provided. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528
P.2d 1148, 1150-51 (Cal. 1975). See generally Henderson, Product Liability and Admissibility
of Subsequent Remedial Measures: Resolving the Conflict by Recognizing the Difference Between Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 64 NEB. L. REV. 1, 11-16 (1985)(discussing distinction between strict liability and negligence).
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)(no proof of culpability required). Liability under strict product liability theory is imposed "although the seller has
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product." Id.
68. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980)(suit against manufacturer not product), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981). The manufacturer pays regardless of
the emphasis. Cann v. Ford, 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981).
69. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
70. See Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 887 (5th Cir.
1983)(voluntary repair may be discouraged by allowing evidence). The Advisory Committee
Notes emphasize encouragement of repairs as a primary justification. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note. See generally INTRODUCTION TO LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5.17 (2d ed.
1987).
71. See, e.g., Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir.
1980)(risk of increasing liability by repairing may dissuade improvements); Werner, 628 F.2d
at 857 (admission of evidence inhibits repairs whether allowed under negligence or strict liability theory), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803, 805 (2d
Cir. 197 5)(some manufacturers avoid repairs since risk of increasing liability outweighs risk of
maintaining status quo). See generally Sales, Product Liability in Texas, 23 Hous. L. REV. 1,
174 (1986)(detailing public policy behind rule's effect on subsequent repairs).
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rationale by holding that manufacturers would make improvements regardless of the admissibility of the evidence to avoid the damaging impact which
would result from inaction.7 2 As other courts opposing the Fifth Circuit's
position have asserted, economic reality dictates that manufacturers make
the improvements even if the evidence of the changes may be used against
them.7 3 Furthermore, opponents claim that by excluding the evidence, the
plaintiff's case is more difficult to prove, thereby undermining the decreased
burden of proof justification for adopting a strict product liability theory.7 4
In response to the opponents' arguments, subscribers to the Fifth Circuit
position reason that the manufacturer's actions will depend upon a balancing
of the potential for increased liability from future accidents against the impact the admission of the repairs will have on their present cases. 7" Perhaps
in the future an empirical study will be undertaken to determine the practical effect of this rule on the actions of manufacturers, but currently this
rationale is indefinite support for either position since both views have persuasive arguments.
The final reason for the Fifth Circuit's holding that evidence of subsequent
remedial measures is inadmissible is the questionable effectiveness of a limiting instruction. 76 As previously noted, suits for injuries resulting from allegedly defective products are often brought under both strict product liability

72. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1151-52 (Cal. 1975). The court
reasoned that, given the "tens of thousands of units of goods" produced by the average manufacturing defendant, to presume the manufacturer would forego repairs and risk greater total
liability and adverse publicity is unrealistic. Id. at 1152.
73. See, e.g., Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv. Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1327-28 (10th Cir.
1983)(manufacturer would not risk punitive damages imposed by juries or government agencies or cancellation of insurance); Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 251, 257 n.7 (S.D.
1976)(economic realities dictate repair to avoid massive liability); Chart v. General Motors,
258 N.W.2d 680, 684 (Wis. 1977)(course set by economic realities). See generally Note, The
Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict Liability Actions: Some Suggestions
RegardingFederalRule of Evidence 407, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1415, 1427-28 (1982)(commenting on economic self-interest of manufacturers in repairing products).
74. See Phipps v. General Motors, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976)(burden of proof eased
to allow better compensation of innocent consumer); see also Henderson, Products Liability
and Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures: Resolving the Conflict by Recognizing the
Difference Between Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 64 NEB. L. REV. 1, 7 (1985)(listing
difficult burden of proof as one justification for adopting a strict liability theory). See generally
Recent Cases, Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures and Products Liability: Herndon v.
Seven Bar Flying Serv. Inc., 33 DE PAUL L. REV. 857, 868-69 (1984)(stating rule thwarts
strict liability's easing of burden of proof).
75. Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984). The court stated
that "accidents are low-probability events." Id. The court concluded that the probability of a
future accident may be lower than the probability of the victim suing and making devastating
use of subsequent remedial measures as evidence. Id.
76. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980)(admission under products liability theory subverts policy behind excluding for negligence), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
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and negligence theories.7 7 Subsequent remedial measures are almost univer-

sally held to be inadmissible in negligence cases to prove negligent or culpa-

ble conduct.7" If a subsequent remedial measure is held to be admissible
under strict product liability theory, the jury would be instructed that the
evidence may not be used to prove negligent or culpable conduct, but may be
only be considered for purposes of determining whether a product defect

existed at the time of manufacture.79 However, common sense and many
commentators respond that such distinctions are virtually impossible for a

jury to make.80

While these justifications may persuade legislatures or courts which have
not adopted a rule, they will probably not aid an attorney presenting a case
where a rule has already been adopted. Since both the Fifth Circuit and the

Texas courts have already established rules, an attorney who argues in favor
of a rule change will likely be ineffective in obtaining that change, since the
court will likely follow previous precedent on the issue. Therefore, it is more

important for an attorney practicing- in Texas to be able to work within the
confines of the applicable rules to achieve the result desired.
V.

A.

OVERCOMING THE RULE BARRIERS

Fifth Circuit
Under the Fifth Circuit view on the admissibility of subsequent remedial

1080 (1981); see also Capara v. Chrysler Corp., 417 N.E.2d 545, 556 (N.Y. 1981)(evidence will
be improperly used by jury in determining negligence issue).
77. See, e.g., Middleton v. Harris Press and Shear Inc., 796 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir.
1986)(suit under negligence and product liability); Cann v. Ford, 658 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir.
1981)(action using negligence and strict liability theories); Werner, 628 F.2d at 851 (suit based
on product liability and negligence).
78. See 3 & 4 JOSEPH, SALTZBURG, & THE TRIAL EVIDENCE COMMITTEE OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LITIGATION, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES (1987)(citing rules from thirty states which exclude evidence in
two-volume appendix). See generally Note, The Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict Liability Actions: Some Suggestions Regarding FederalRule of Evidence 407, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1415, 1415-16 & n.2 (1982)(explaining state treatment of rule).
79. See Federal Pr.c. Elec. Co. v. Woodend, 735 S.W.2d 887, 892 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1987, no writ)(commenting on need for limiting instruction); see also Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir. 1980)(holding reversible error not
to issue limiting instruction).
80. See generallyComment, FederalRule ofEvidence 407 and Strict ProductsLiability The Rule Against Subsequent Repair Lives On, 48 J. AIR L. & COM. 887, 916 (1983)(warning
ineffective to prevent jury misuse); Note, Admissibility of Change of Condition or Repair After
Injury as Evidence of Negligence, 15 S.D.L. REV. 287, 299 (1970)(citing study which reveals
that jury does not understand limiting instruction); Note, The Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict Liability Actions: Some Suggestions Regarding FederalRule of Evidence 407, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1415, 1432-33 (1982)(detailing problem with limiting
instruction).
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evidence in product liability cases, rule 407 stands as a barrier to the injured
plaintiff's case since evidence of the change from which the jury may infer a
product defect is excluded. Therefore, the plaintiff's attorney must use an
exception to the rule which would allow admission of the evidence. 8 Federal Rule of Evidence 407 provides several exceptions to the general rule of
exclusion. 2 Where evidence of change was proffered under one of these exceptions, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly
allowed the evidence to be admit83
ted for that restricted purpose.
Assuming that the evidence of the change is proffered under one of the
permissible exceptions to exclusion, the attorney faces an additional obstacle
to admissibility from Federal Rule of Evidence 403.84 If the judge determines that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative
value, the evidence may nevertheless be excluded regardless of the applicable
exception.8 5 Given the traditional justification of the Fifth Circuit for exclusion that such evidence is low in probative value, the plaintiff's attorney has
a difficult burden to overcome.8 6 To meet this burden, the plaintiff's attorney should rely on the cases opposing the Fifth Circuit view which hold that
subsequent remedial evidence is highly probative of product defects.87 How-

81. FED. R. EvID. 407. Rule 407 excludes the evidence. Id.
82. See id. The rule states:
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered
for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary
measures, if controverted, or impeachment.

Id.
83. See, e.g., Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888-89
(5th Cir. 1983)(noting feasibility exception requires contravention); Woolard v. Mobil Pipe
Line Co., 479 F.2d 557, 563 (5th Cir.)(evidence to be admitted under control exception), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1025 (1973); American Airlines v. United States, 418 F.2d 180, 196 (5th Cir.
1969)(evidence allowed for impeachment purposes). See generally Comment, FederalRule of
Evidence 407 and Strict Products Liability - The Rule Against Subsequent Repairs Lives On,
48 J. AIR L. & CoM. 887, 900-906 (1983)(discussing various exceptions in detail).
84. FED. R. EvID. 403. The rule states:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
Id. See generally Blakely, Article IV. Relevancy and Its Limits, 20 Hous. L. REV. 151, 219
(1983)(stating rule 403 might cause exclusion of subsequent remedial evidence under strict
liability theory).
85. See FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note (explaining how evidence unquestionably relevant may be excluded if great prejudicial effect would result).
86. See Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 887-88 (5th
Cir. 1983)(using low relevancy as main justification for exclusion); see also Werner v. Upjohn
Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980)(low probative value since other reasons for change),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
87. See, e.g., Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv. Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir.
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ever, this will not likely be effective since the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly
held that the prejudicial effect of evidence of subsequent changes outweighs
its probative value thereby excluding the evidence."8
B.

Texas Courts

Under the Texas view, which allows evidence of subsequent repair to be
admitted in strict liability cases, the defendant manufacturer must overcome
the damaging evidence the rule admits. The defendant's attorney should
first consider removal to federal court if possible since the Fifth Circuit excludes the evidence.8 9 In Muzyka v. Remington Arms Co. ,9 the attorney for
Remington utilized this option and removed the case to federal court. 91 In
Muzyka, a woman was injured when her stepfather accidentally fired a rifle
he was attempting to unload. 92 In order to unload the rifle, the safety had to
be placed in fire position.9 3 A few months after the accident, Remington
adopted a new design which allowed the gun to be unloaded with the safety
in place. 94 Remington would have been able to prevent the admission of the
evidence of the design change under the Fifth Circuit view of rule 407 if
Remington had restricted questioning of the expert witness." Since Rem-

1983)(holding Fifth Circuit's low probative rationale unconvincing); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 794 (Ala. 1981)(subsequent modifications highly probative of product
character); Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 281 N.E.2d 749, 753 (Ill. App. 1972)(subsequent change relevant to design alternative feasibility); Capara v. Chrysler Corp., 417 N.E.2d
545, 551 (N.Y. 1981)(probability of product defect increased by evidence of change).
88. See, e.g., Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 719-20 (5th Cir.
1986)(excluding evidence of subsequent change due to prejudicial effect); Middleton v. Harris
Press & Shear Inc., 796 F.2d 747, 751-52 (5th Cir. 1986)(evidence of third party changes
subsequent to accident still inadmissible under 403); Alexander v. Conveyors & Dumpers,
Inc., 731 F.2d 1221, 1229-30 (5th Cir. 1984)(excluding evidence due to prejudicial effect where
feasibility not in issue). Both the Koonce case and the Middleton case separate the arguments
under 403 from the assertions that the evidence is admissible as an exception to the rule.
Compare Koonce, 798 F.2d at 720 (discussing prejudicial effect separate from control exception), with Middleton, 796 F.2d at 752 (discussing effect of rule 403 separate from feasibility
exception). But see Reese v. Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 793 F.2d 1416, 1429
(5th Cir. 1986)(court unpersuaded by 403 argument).
89. See Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 885 (5th Cir.
1983)(analyzing applicability of state or federal rules in diversity action and concluding federal
rules apply excluding evidence); see also Middleton, 796 F.2d at 751 (applying federal rule
which holds evidence of post-accident repairs to be inadmissible).
90. 774 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1985).
91. Muzyka, 774 F.2d at 1313.
92. Id. at 1310.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1313. The original exclusion of the evidence under a motion in limine was held
to be proper. Id. However, due to the tone of the argument, the evidence should have been
allowed for impeachment purposes. Id.
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ington's witness claimed on direct examination that the rifle design at the
time of the accident could not be improved and was the best ever devised,
the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in not admitting evidence
of the improved design for impeachment purposes.9 6 Since the evidence
would have been admitted under the Texas rule, although excluded under

the federal rule, removal would have been a well-employed strategical tactic.
Assuming there is no possibility of removal, the manufacturer's attorney
should argue that the evidence is inadmissible under rule 403. 97 The defense
attorney should first assert that low probative value is a traditional justification for exclusion.9 8 By revealing the numerous possible reasons why a manufacturer might change its product, the attorney may be able to reduce the
strength of the inference that the change was made to correct defects,
thereby decreasing its probative value on the issue of the defect. 99 If the suit
has been brought under both strict product liability and negligence theories,
the attorney should argue that the admission of the evidence would adversely affect the negligence theory, since the jury may misuse the evidence
by applying it to prove negligent or culpable conduct."i° Furthermore, in
attempting to establish the rule 403 barrier to admission, the attorney
should draw on the precedent from the Fifth Circuit excluding subsequent

remedial evidence on 403 grounds."01 The Fifth Circuit's rationale for ex-

cluding subsequent remedial evidence on 403 grounds is explained in Gre-

96. Id. at 1311-13.
97. See TEX. R. EVID. 403 (excluding evidence where prejudicial effect outweighs probative value).
98. See, e.g., Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 887-88
(5th Cir. 1983)(1ow relevancy main reason for exclusion); Ault v. International Harvester Co.,
528 P.2d 1148, 1156 (Cal. 1975)(Clark, J., dissenting)(change to lower production costs, increase marketability and efficiency not due to product defect); Haysom v. Coleman Lantern
Co., 573 P.2d 785, 791 (Wash. 1978)(probative value of product defect low since other reasons
for change). See generally INTRODUCTION TO LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5.17 (2d ed. 1987)(ex-

plaining relevancy rationale for excluding evidence).
99. See Ault, 528 P.2d at 1156 (Clark, J., dissenting)(possible reasons for change include
increased marketability of efficiency and lower production costs).
100. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980)(admitting evidence
under strict liability allows use by jury in determining negligence), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080
(1981); see also Capara v. Chrysler Corp., 417 N.E.2d 545, 556 (N.Y. 1981)(potential for jury
misuse). See generally Note, Admissibility of Change of Condition or Repair After Injury as
Evidence of Negligence, 15 S.D.L. REV. 287, 299 (1970)(study analyzing effect of limiting instruction on jury conduct).
101. See, e.g., Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 720 (5th Cir.
1986)(stating prejudicial effect mandates exclusion); Middleton v. Harris Press & Shear Inc.,
796 F.2d 747, 750 (5th Cir. 1986)(post-accident change by third party still inadmissible due to
prejudicial effect); Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 889 (5th
Cir. 1983)(upholding exclusion of subsequent change evidence due to confusion and misleading dangers).
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nada Steel Industries v. Alabama Oxygen Company.'°2 In considering the
exclusion of evidence of design changes, the court held that the evidence was
inadmissible due to "dangers of confusion and misleading the jury."' 10 3 The
court explained that the jury's attention would be diverted from the time of
manufacture to an irrelevant later date, creating confusion in the jurors'
minds."4 One Texas court has already indicated its receptivity to the 403
argument by holding that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is "not
automatically admissible" in product liability cases.105 The court asserted
that "other rules of evidence may apply to bar the admission of such evidence.' ' 6 Rule 403 is likely to be one of the "other rules of evidence"
which applies.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In product liability cases, subsequent remedial measures are inadmissible
as evidence in the Fifth Circuit, but Texas courts allow the evidence to be
admitted due to differences between the Federal and Texas rules and the
courts' interpretations of those rules. Attorneys must be able to work within
the confines of the rules and interpretations applicable to their cases to
achieve the result they desire. The plaintiff's attorney should draw on exceptions to inadmissibility and argue that subsequent remedial evidence is
highly probative to try to overcome the Fifth Circuit's exclusionary position.
The defendant manufacturer's attorney should try to remove the case to federal court or argue that rule 403 applies to persuade the Texas courts that
the subsequent remedial measures should be inadmissible as evidence in a
product liability area.

102. GrenadaSteel, 695 F.2d at 888.

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Federal Pac. Elec. Co. v. Woodend, 735 S.W.2d 887, 892 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1987, no writ). The court held that while Texas rule 407 does not automatically prevent admissibility of such evidence, it does not "automatically render such evidence admissible." Id.
106. Id.
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